Case study · Mergers & acquisitions · Illustrative
Built before close
How governance established before the deal shaped an integration, from the founder’s preparation to the board’s six-month review
The choices that decide an integration are made before the deal closes. The question is whether anyone makes them deliberately.
Acquirer
Northfield Infrastructure · $480M multi-state engineering and construction; one prior small acquisition
Acquired business
Larkspur Engineering · $70M water and environmental engineering; founder-led, ~350 employees, 7 offices
Clients
Municipal utilities, many on multi-year framework contracts
Northfield
David Okafor, CEO · Sarah Lindqvist, VP Operations
Larkspur
Ruth Calloway, Founder and CEO · Marcus Bell, Senior Project Manager
Instrument deployed
SCALE™ Engine — seller preparation, acquirer readiness, Day 30 check, six-month baseline
A composite case. Northfield Infrastructure, Larkspur Engineering and all individuals are fictional. The case draws on SagaciousThink practitioner experience; all figures and assessment results are illustrative.
Introduction
The deal
Northfield Infrastructure is a multi-state engineering and construction firm with $480 million in revenue. It has completed one small tuck-in acquisition before; this is its first acquisition of real size. Larkspur Engineering is a $70 million water and environmental engineering firm with about 350 employees across seven offices. Ruth Calloway founded Larkspur 24 years ago and still leads it.
The acquisition strategy. Two years earlier, Northfield’s board and management agreed an acquisition strategy: expand into adjacent regions and add specialized engineering capabilities that complement Northfield’s construction business. The strategy targets firms of roughly $30 million to $100 million in revenue, limits Northfield to one significant acquisition at a time so integration does not outrun its capacity and makes protecting a target’s client relationships and technical talent an explicit priority.
The deal thesis. Larkspur fits that strategy. Expand into Larkspur’s region, add specialized water-infrastructure capability, and retain Larkspur’s long-standing client relationships, many of them multi-year framework contracts with municipal utilities.
The deal structure. Ruth stays on as President of the Larkspur business for two years. Part of her consideration is an earnout tied to revenue retention and EBITDA from the Larkspur business in years one and two. How the integration is governed will directly affect what she receives.
Two ways of working. Larkspur runs on fast, informal decisions and long personal relationships. Northfield runs on defined processes, approval thresholds, and central functions. Neither is wrong, given each company’s stage, and both help the firm succeed. How those two ways of working meet is one of the threads this case follows.
How to read this case
Each chapter tells the story twice. The Without SCALE™ version is a story of experienced people who do their work well, and the deal still loses value in places standard diligence isn’t designed to look. The With SCALE™ version follows the same people through the same deal, with assessment readings informing their decisions.
Three underlying problems arise in both versions. This is a first significant acquisition, and first deals produce mistakes. What differs is when each problem becomes visible, who can act on it, what its consequences turn out to be, and whether anything is learned for the next deal.
The lens: five pillars
SCALE™ assesses an organization across five pillars: Strategic Alignment, Capability to Execute, Accountability & Governance, Leadership & Culture, and Enterprise Resilience. The word is deliberate. Like the pillars of a structure, each carries part of the load, and if one is weakened, everything above it becomes less stable. An acquisition adds load to both organizations at once. The question this case follows is where that load will land, and whether it can be reinforced before close rather than repaired after.
Chapter 1 · Before going to market
Larkspur prepares for sale
Ruth is approaching 60 and has no internal successor. She wants Larkspur to continue, her people to be protected, and a fair price for 24 years of work. She decides to explore a sale.
Without SCALE™
Ruth engages a respected sell-side banker and an accounting firm. The quality-of-earnings review normalizes EBITDA and resolves a related-party lease. The management presentation describes an experienced team of office leaders with deep client relationships. All of it is accurate.
What the preparation does not test is how Larkspur runs. Pricing on major bids, approval for purchases above a modest threshold, the relationships with the three largest utility clients, and the five-year strategy all route through Ruth. It comes up in passing during preparation but is not examined in depth, because it has always worked.
With SCALE™
Ruth engages the same banker and the same accounting firm. In addition, about 18 months before going to market, Ruth and eight senior leaders complete the SCALE Engine as part of exit preparation. Five findings stand out:
- Accountability & Governance. Leaders rate decision-making highly, but the evidence behind those ratings is thin: little documented authority, no defined escalation, few records of how decisions are made. The pattern is False Stability (illustrative: pillar composite 4.0, evidence 2.2). Governance works because Ruth makes it work.
- Divergence on authority. Ruth rates decision authority as delegated. Her office leaders rate it as centralized. Both are sincere, and the gap between them is itself the finding.
- Strategic Alignment. The strategy is clear to Ruth and much less clear one level down.
- Leadership & Culture. Loyalty is strong, and much of it is loyalty to Ruth personally.
- Enterprise Resilience. The three largest client relationships all run through Ruth: customer concentration held by one person.
Before acting, Ruth’s team checks the readings against the record. Approval logs show that most purchases above the threshold carry Ruth’s sign-off, and a simple client-ownership map confirms that the three largest relationships run through her. The readings raised the questions; the records confirmed the pattern.
Over the next 12 months, Larkspur acts on what it found:
- Authority limits for purchasing, pricing and hiring are documented.
- A three-year strategy is written with the office leaders, not just for them.
- Two of the three largest utility relationships move to named office leaders, with Ruth in a supporting role.
- Two second-line leaders begin a development plan.
Not everything has been addressed, as the third major client relationship still centers on Ruth, and purchasing authority is documented on paper but still informal in practice. A second reading before going to market shows the evidence supporting Accountability & Governance has improved. Ruth goes to market knowing where her firm stands, including what is not yet done.
What made the difference
Founder concentration was not one risk. It appeared in four of the five pillars. Addressing it before the sale changed what a buyer would find, and how Ruth would be able to talk about it.
Chapter 2 · Before the letter of intent
Northfield tests its own readiness
Northfield’s corporate development team identifies Larkspur as a strong fit. The thesis is sound, and the financial model is detailed.
Without SCALE™
The case for the deal rests on three benefits of combining: purchasing savings through central buying, offering Larkspur’s water capability to Northfield’s existing clients, and shared overhead. The cost of combining the businesses appears as a modest line item, scaled from Northfield’s earlier tuck-in.
Sarah Lindqvist, VP of Operations, is named integration leader. She will do this alongside her current role leading Northfield’s ERP rollout, which is mid-implementation. The board approves the deal after good, probing questions about price, financing, and the expected benefits. Capacity to deliver comes up briefly and is answered with confidence in Sarah, without examining what else is competing for the same people.
With SCALE™
Before the letter of intent, Northfield’s executive team and functional leaders complete the SCALE Engine as an acquirer-readiness reading. Four findings shape the deal:
- Capability to Execute is strained. The ERP rollout is already consuming finance and IT capacity: the same people the integration will need. Forward Stress shows integration load concentrating on finance, IT, and operations leadership in the first two quarters after close.
- Strategic Alignment is split. The executives agree on the thesis but not on the target model. Some assume Larkspur will be absorbed quickly; others assume it will run separately.
- Accountability & Governance has a gap. No one has defined who decides what in the combined company.
- Leadership & Culture is assumed, not examined. Executives describe Larkspur’s people as “just like ours.” The reading prompts a harder question: how differently do the two firms make decisions, approve spending, and handle clients?
Each finding is checked before it shapes a decision. The ERP resource plan confirms that the same finance and IT leads are assigned to both efforts, and short conversations with each executive confirm the split view of the target model.
Northfield makes five decisions as a result:
- Sarah becomes full-time integration leader. Her deputy takes over the ERP rollout, sequenced so Larkspur joins the ERP only after Northfield’s own go-live.
- The target model is absorption; the Day 1 posture is preservation. Both are written down and approved by the board.
- The cost of combining is budgeted explicitly, with an owner: integration leadership, systems, retention and training.
- Comparing the two firms’ ways of working is added to diligence.
- The board approves the deal with the readiness findings alongside the financial case.
Mistake 1The systems portion of the integration budget is still underestimated. Larkspur’s project-accounting data is far more customized than Northfield assumed. The readiness reading flagged systems as a pressure point, but the dollar estimate came from Northfield’s experience with a much smaller acquisition.
What made the difference
Diligence examines the target. Northfield also examined itself and found the capacity constraint that would have shaped the integration either way.
Bridge · Diligence
Where both sides meet
Diligence is the first moment each organization’s readiness becomes visible to the other.
Without SCALE™
Northfield’s diligence team finds what Larkspur’s preparation did not examine: key decisions, pricing, and client relationships run through Ruth. Northfield responds as buyers typically do with a larger share of consideration moves into the earnout, and retention terms tighten.
Ruth reads this as a judgment on the firm she built and becomes defensive. The earnout metrics are set by the two finance teams, focused on revenue and EBITDA, with little discussion of how integration decisions might affect them.
With SCALE™
On her banker’s advice about timing and scope, Larkspur shares a summary of its readings and the actions it took. Diligence still finds founder concentration: the remaining client relationship and the informal purchasing practice. But the conversation shifts from “is there risk?” to “how is it being managed, and what is left?”
The earnout remains part of the deal, at a smaller share of consideration. The two sides discuss which integration decisions could affect the earnout metrics, including purchasing changes and the timing of systems conversion, and agree how those will be handled. Ruth enters the integration as a partner rather than a defendant.
The two leadership teams also compare how each firm works: who approves what, how client issues are handled, how people are recognized. The biggest difference is purchasing. Larkspur’s project leaders buy what the job needs, fast; Northfield routes purchases through central approval. Because the difference surfaces before close, purchasing governance is designed before Day 1 rather than imposed on it.
What made the difference
A seller who can show governance evidence shapes the diligence conversation instead of reacting to it.
Chapter 3 · Day 1 through Day 100
Integration, informed
Without SCALE™
Sarah, still splitting her time with the ERP rollout, runs a credible 100-day plan built on Northfield’s playbook: Day 1 communications, financial controls, IT access, and benefits. Central purchasing is implemented on Day 1 for consistency and early savings.
Mistake 2Within weeks, Larkspur project leaders report delays on urgent field purchases. Exceptions are handled ad hoc through Ruth and Northfield’s procurement head, and frustration grows on both sides. Larkspur staff read the new approval layers as a sign that the way they work is no longer trusted. It is a culture clash, though nobody calls it one.
Mistake 3Marcus Bell, a senior project manager, holds Larkspur’s relationship with a mid-sized utility worth about 6% of Larkspur’s revenue. Diligence focused on Ruth, so Marcus was never identified as critical. He feels sidelined by the new approval layers, and at Day 70 he accepts an offer from a competitor. The client follows him within a quarter. Internally, it is recorded as ordinary attrition.
The 100-day report says the plan is on track, and the expected benefits are being pursued.
With SCALE™
Organizational Intelligence™
Decision-grade, forward-looking information about how the organization is functioning. It complements the board’s financial oversight rather than duplicating it: the financials show what has happened, organizational intelligence shows whether the organization can keep delivering.
At Day 30, Sarah and Ruth run a focused check with both leadership teams and Larkspur’s project managers on a few early signals: how decisions are being made, how purchasing is working, and how people see their future in the combined company. It is not a baseline; too much is still changing. But Northfield and Larkspur leaders describe decision-making very differently, which tells Sarah and Ruth where Larkspur’s ways of working must be preserved and where common processes genuinely matter. Purchasing is governed from the start: local leaders keep authority within agreed limits, both businesses use common reporting and vendor checks, exceptions go to a named executive with a defined response time, and leadership reviews savings alongside project delays and control exceptions.
Mistake 2It still happens. The exception response time is set at three business days, which is too slow for field work, and exceptions pile up. But because exceptions are tracked and reviewed, the pattern is visible by about Day 40. Response time for field-critical purchases drops to same day.
Mistake 3Marcus still was not identified as critical before close. But the Day 30 check shows Larkspur’s project managers rating their authority and their future in the combined company markedly lower than the office leaders do. Sarah and Ruth follow up with conversations across the project management group and a check of client-ownership records. Marcus’s client role surfaces, and a retention conversation gives him a defined role in the combined firm. He stays. The client relationship goes through a rough patch, including one delayed task order, but it is retained.
Mistake 1Data-conversion scoping at Day 60 reveals the systems cost gap. Because the cost of combining is a named budget with an owner, the gap is escalated with options: phase the conversion, or increase the budget. The board is informed and approves a phased approach.
What made the difference
The mistakes were not prevented. They became visible while there were still options and reached people who could act on them.
Chapter 4 · Six months after close
How is the combined company doing?
Part A: Early returns and a new baseline
Without SCALE™
The board pack contains a tracker of the expected benefits and the financials. Purchasing savings are ahead of plan. Selling water capability to Northfield clients is slower than expected. Shared overhead is on track. The client loss is noted as one-off attrition.
Mistake 1The systems cost was underestimated here too. It surfaced in month four as an overrun and was absorbed from the operating budget, with no named owner and no options put to the board.
Revenue retention from the Larkspur business is below the earnout trajectory. Ruth raises concerns that central decisions, including purchasing and the handling of Marcus’s departure, were outside her control but are now affecting her earnout. The board asks good questions, but it has mostly financial information to answer them with. It cannot see whether the organization underneath can sustain the results.
With SCALE™
The board receives the same financials alongside a six-month reading, framed against the acquisition strategy it approved two years earlier. It is too early to judge whether the deal has delivered, and too much has changed for a simple before-and-after comparison. Instead, the reading establishes the combined company’s new baseline, read alongside both firms’ pre-merger readings for context, to show what has changed and where to focus next. The pack covers four areas:
- Value realized. Purchasing savings are slightly behind plan, because local authority limits trade some savings for project speed. This was a deliberate choice, and it is reviewed. Selling water capability to Northfield clients has early wins. The phased systems approach is on its revised budget.
- Organizational change. The new baseline suggests decision authority has largely settled where it was designed to, and the record supports it: escalated purchasing exceptions have fallen steadily since Day 40. Leadership & Culture is still carrying strain in two Larkspur offices, consistent with what project managers said at Day 30, and the two firms’ ways of working have moved closer but not converged. Both have an action plan and an owner. Because the combined reading draws on a different group of people than either pre-merger reading, the comparison is directional, not a score-to-score measure of improvement.
- Forward view. The next six months will put load on finance and IT again as Larkspur moves onto Northfield’s ERP. The reading shows where.
- Earnout. Revenue retention is on trajectory (illustrative).
The board’s post-close questions now have evidence behind the answers: Is the acquisition still advancing the strategy? Is realized value meeting the investment case? Are integration choices eroding the value we acquired?
Governance did not create the benefits of the combination. It helped protect them, made the remaining risk visible, and gave the board evidence that the organization can keep delivering. Value realized, plus evidence of the capacity to sustain it, is a stronger return than financial results alone. And governance did not end at close: the new baseline is where the combined company’s ongoing oversight begins, with later readings tracking change from here.
Part B: The governance review
Without SCALE™
The integration team holds a debrief. Lessons are discussed openly, and Sarah notes she would want to be full-time next time. A short summary is circulated, but the lessons are not built into the process or assigned to anyone. Northfield’s next acquisition will start largely from the memories of the people who happened to be in the room.
With SCALE™
A governance review at six months brings together the integration team, the executive team, and the board, each with its own question. Every lesson must produce a specific change, an accountable owner, and a place in the next deal’s process.
Closing
Toward deal two
A year later, Northfield begins evaluating its next acquisition.
Without SCALE™
Northfield starts again from the same playbook and the same assumptions. Sarah has moved to a new role. The lessons of the Larkspur deal are real, but they live mostly in a few people’s heads.
With SCALE™
Northfield starts from a tested governance structure, revised assumptions about the cost of combining, critical relationships and cultural differences, readings that show what “ready” looked like last time, a new baseline for the combined company, and a small bench of leaders who have run integration workstreams. The deal-specific choices, including the target model, the pace and what must be protected, are still made fresh.
Not identical, but well crafted. Not starting from scratch.
What the research observes
KPMG’s analysis of more than 3,000 public-company acquisitions over $100 million, completed between 2012 and 2022, found that 57.2% of acquirers ultimately destroyed shareholder value. It also found that acquirers with a track record of value-creating deals are more likely to create value in the deals that follow.
PwC’s 2023 M&A Integration Survey found that only 14% of respondents reported significant success across strategic, operational and financial measures. Among those Successful M&A Organizations, 78% spent 6% or more of deal value on integration. Across all respondents, 60% now plan the long-term operating model before due diligence, up from 25% in 2019.
These studies describe acquisition performance broadly. KPMG’s analysis covers large public-company deals rather than the middle market, and neither study evaluates SCALE™. They are context, not validation: they describe what successful acquirers tend to have in common, and this case illustrates what building that capability can look like inside one company, with SCALE™ readings helping track it from one deal to the next.
Appendix
Terms used in this case
SCALE™. SagaciousThink’s framework for assessing organizational readiness across five pillars: Strategic Alignment, Capability to Execute, Accountability & Governance, Leadership & Culture, and Enterprise Resilience. The pillar metaphor is load-bearing: each pillar carries part of the organization’s load, and weakening any one makes the structure above it less stable.
SCALE Engine. A multi-rater organizational assessment. Leaders at different levels rate the organization independently; results are consolidated into pillar scores, the evidence supporting them, and the divergence between rater groups.
Baseline. The reading that later readings are compared against. An integration changes too much for post-close readings to be read as a trend against pre-merger ones. Instead, a reading six to twelve months after close becomes the combined company’s new baseline. Read alongside the pre-merger readings for context, it shows what changed and where to focus; because the groups of raters differ, that comparison is directional rather than score-to-score. Later readings track change from the new baseline.
Divergence. A meaningful difference in how rater groups score the same pillar, such as a founder and office leaders. Divergence is often a finding in its own right.
False Stability. A pillar rated highly (composite of 3.8 or above) while the evidence supporting that rating is weak (2.5 or below). Confidence is running ahead of evidence.
Forward Stress. The Engine’s forward-looking view of where pressure on each pillar is likely to concentrate.
Organizational Intelligence™. Decision-grade, forward-looking information about how the organization is functioning, complementing rather than duplicating the board’s financial oversight.
Transactional Readiness. SagaciousThink’s delivery track for M&A and IPO preparation, on both the buy side and the sell side.
About this case
This is a composite case. Northfield Infrastructure, Larkspur Engineering and all individuals are fictional, and all figures and assessment results are illustrative. The case is drawn from SagaciousThink practitioner experience across founder-led and middle-market organizations.
Sources: KPMG, The M&A Dance: Orchestrating Synergies and Value Creation in Public Company Acquisitions, 2025. PwC, Transact to Transform: PwC’s 2023 M&A Integration Survey, 2023.