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Readiness Is Three Questions. The Skills Matrix Answers One.

A response to Lindsay Trout’s “Beyond the Checkbox,” and what it would take to measure what she describes.

Lindsay Trout of Egon Zehnder published a sharp piece this week (November 16th) in Alpha BoardBrief arguing that the board skills matrix is a useful starting point but no longer enough. Her central idea is that what matters is readiness rather than inventory: whether the board is prepared for the business the company is becoming, not whether every box on the grid has a name beside it.

In June, in Beyond the Matrix, I argued that the matrix answers a narrower question than boards now face: it shows where expertise exists, not what the board can do with it. Trout’s readiness framing sharpens that argument and raises the practical question: how would a board know whether it is ready?

The matrix is everywhere. In the 2026 Spencer Stuart Board Index, 80% of S&P 500 boards disclosed a director skills matrix in their most recent proxy. Spencer Stuart adds its own caution: “a skills matrix is only as valuable as the information it includes.” Its ubiquity isn’t the problem. The problem is that one measurement is being asked to do the work of three.

Readiness breaks into three questions:

1.    What does the strategy require of this board?

2.   What capability is actually on the board?

3.   Is that capability being used?

A matrix answers the second question roughly, and the other two not at all. And each question has to be tested under two conditions: against the decisions the company expects to make, and against the decisions it may be forced to make. A board that is ready for its strategic plan can still be unready for the week the plan stops applying.

1. What does the strategy require?

Trout argues for starting with the company’s future requirements and working backward to the board. The practical difficulty is sequence. Most boards build the matrix around the directors they already have, so the incumbents quietly set the template.

In my experience, the most useful discipline is to define the board the strategy needs before looking at the current directors at all: which capabilities are essential now, which will be needed within 18 months, and which within three years. Only then hold the current board up against it. Spencer Stuart makes a parallel recommendation, urging boards to check whether their expertise matches where the company is going.

Readiness also has a date on it. A board can be ready today and not in eighteen months, because capability leaves when a director’s term ends. Most matrices show the board as it stands, not the cliff ahead.

2. What is actually on the board?

Here the matrix records presence but not depth. The Conference Board’s April 2026 analysis of S&P 500 disclosures shows how that plays out. Between 2021 and 2025, the share of directors with disclosed technology expertise rose from 20% to 51%. Over the same period, disclosed AI expertise moved from 1.5% to 2.7%, while 83% of those companies now disclose AI as a material risk. The broad checkmark grew quickly; the specific capability barely moved.

How a skill is defined also changes the answer. On the Conference Board’s measure, expertise that boards themselves disclose, 2.7% of S&P 500 directors have AI expertise. ISS, classifying directors’ backgrounds in data analyzed by Morgan Stanley, identifies around one-fifth of S&P 500 directors as having AI skills. Neither figure is wrong. They measure different things, and neither measures whether a director can govern AI. That is the checkbox problem in a single pair of statistics: the same board can appear to have AI expertise or not, depending on who defines the box. As one independent director told an Egon Zehnder roundtable: “There is an increasing delta between skills and credentials.”

Three further problems sit underneath the matrix.

Depth has to be distributed, or the board defers. In September, in A Skill on the Board Does Not Make a Board Capability, I set out why coverage has to be read as a pattern rather than a count: an anchor who can lead, at least one director who can interpret and challenge, and enough literacy across the rest of the board to participate rather than defer. Where a domain rests on one expert, oversight of that area becomes oversight by one person.

AI shows why this matters now. Even on ISS’s broader definition, two-thirds of S&P 500 companies have at least one non-executive director with AI skills, but only 24% have three or more. My reading is that on many boards, AI oversight rests with one or two people. It is the pattern I walked through in an illustrative case in August, where a board’s confidence in its AI oversight rested on one or two directors and on management’s assurances. Egon Zehnder’s guidance makes the same point from the other side: the aim is not a board of AI experts, but a board able to govern AI, including challenging management’s assumptions.

Expertise can be a liability, not just a gap. Picture a director rated as the board’s expert in a domain, whose knowledge was formed in an earlier technology cycle or regulatory regime. That director can anchor the board’s discussion on an outdated view. This is worse than an open gap, because the board believes the area is covered and defers accordingly. It is most dangerous where depth is concentrated: when no one else on the board can test what the expert says, an outdated view goes unchallenged. The matrix cannot show it: it records that expertise exists, not when it was last current.

A full matrix can still be a convergent board. In research Ralf Barkemeyer and I published in the Journal of Management and Governance, studying directors in the semiconductor industry, directors’ risk evaluations were shaped by institutional context at the board, company and country levels, with country-level context the strongest. Directors could gravitate toward the risks that were already generally accepted, and more diverse perspectives on a board improved risk identification.

The implication is that a board can be varied in skills and still share one way of seeing risk. A cybersecurity expert, an international executive, a financial specialist and an experienced CEO can each bring different expertise to a strategic threat and still read it through the same assumptions. That is not a composition gap in the conventional sense; it is a question of whether the board’s judgment is independent. The research supports the concern; it does not show that any particular board has converged. What a board can examine is where its directors’ professional judgment was formed, whether those formations are more alike than the matrix suggests, and whether its risk discussions actually surface disagreement or settle quickly on the view everyone already holds.

3. Is it being used?

This is Trout’s strongest point: having the right people does not mean their expertise reaches the decision. Egon Zehnder’s own guidance for board leaders makes the same case, urging chairs to keep the board’s learning current “without allowing expertise gaps to suppress debate,” and asking whether the board is unintentionally signaling deference to management’s expertise.

Use has two layers. The first is individual: does each director bring their expertise into board work, or does it sit idle? The second is the conditions the board creates. Does agenda time go to strategy, or is it consumed by reporting? Does information arrive unfiltered and early enough to prepare? Do committee findings reach the full board with enough substance to debate?

The answers point to different remedies. Where expertise is on the board but the conditions keep it out of the decision, the fix lies in how the board works: meeting design, information flow and how the chair runs the room. As I put it in September, recruiting a technology director will not cure deference to a technology director. Where the expertise is genuinely thin, the fix is composition or development; no amount of facilitation will create it.

Readiness is achieved differently in the middle market

Even the largest boards cannot recruit their way to readiness. S&P 500 boards made the fewest new director appointments since 2016 this year, and turnover fell to 0.7 new directors per board. For a PE-backed or founder-led company with a board of five to seven, recruitment is a weaker lever still. There are not enough seats to fill every cell, expertise is more likely to rest with one person, succession options are thinner, and a founder or sponsor often carries more influence than any matrix records.

But readiness is not simply harder for these boards. It is achieved differently. Smaller boards are usually closer to the business, and they can change how they work far faster than a large-cap board: a new agenda structure, a different board pack or a standing pre-mortem on major decisions can be in place by the next meeting. Their directors also tend to talk more between meetings. That is an advantage only if it is governed, because the same informal channels are where positions get settled before the meeting and where a founder’s view can quietly become the board’s. For these boards, readiness comes mostly from activation and development, with recruitment aimed at the specific gaps the strategy makes essential.

Where to start at your next board evaluation

Steven Wolfe Pereira, founder of Alpha, offers a practical way in: anchor the evaluation in the three most consequential decisions the company expects to face over the next two years. For each, ask which directors have faced something similar, how recently, and what the chair can do to bring their judgment in while the decision is still open.

I would add three things.

•     Ask peers as well as the directors themselves. How a director describes their own experience and how colleagues have seen it applied often differ, and the difference is a finding. Only 49% of S&P 500 boards disclose that they evaluate individual directors, so for many boards the peer view has never been asked for formally.

•     Add one or two decisions nobody has planned for. Nvidia showed last week how quickly one arrives. On November 12, the company announced that its founding CEO had resigned with immediate effect. The board named its CFO interim CEO while she keeps the CFO role, opened a search that will consider internal and external candidates, and appointed its first-ever board chair. That was not a decision any skills matrix would have listed. The question it raises applies to founder-led companies of every size: if the founder left tomorrow, which directors have governed a transition like this, and how recently?

•     For each decision, ask whether every director, not only the experts, could challenge what management brings. If the answer is no, the board will defer on that decision, however strong its experts are.

In my practice, I assess this in two parts. Board Value looks at what is on the board and whether it is put to work: depth as rated by each director and by their peers, whether each director brings that expertise into board work, and how it is distributed across anchor, interpreters and baseline literacy, so a board can see where it governs and where it defers. BoardPulse looks at the conditions around it: whether the board’s culture, information flow and structure let that expertise reach the decision. The two overlap by design; neither alone answers whether a board is ready.

From inventory to readiness

A skills matrix tells a board what expertise it believes it has. Readiness requires knowing what the strategy demands, whether that expertise is deep and current, and whether the board can bring it to bear while decisions are still open.

The distinction matters because a board can look complete on paper and still be unprepared for the decisions ahead. The purpose of evaluation is not a better inventory. It is to find where the board can govern, where it is relying on assumptions, and what needs to change before those assumptions are tested.

Better to find that out in an evaluation than in the week the plan stops applying.

Sources

•     Lindsay Trout, “Beyond the Checkbox: Why the Board Skills Matrix Is No Longer Enough,” Alpha BoardBrief, 18 November 2026. https://boardbrief.alpha.ac/beyond-the-checkbox-why-the-board-skills-matrix-is-no-longer-enough/

•     Spencer Stuart, “2026 U.S. Board Index Highlights,” Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, 30 September 2026. https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/09/30/2026-u-s-board-index-highlights/

•     The Conference Board, “In the S&P 500, Disclosure of AI Risks Surges from 12% to 83%,” press release, 22 April 2026. https://www.conference-board.org/press/governing-AI-2026

•     Morgan Stanley, “How Boards and Executives Are Governing the Rise of AI,” 2026 (ISS data, June 2026). https://morganstanley.com/insights/articles/ai-governance-adoption-report-2026

•     Egon Zehnder, “AI in the Boardroom: Rewiring Strategy, Leadership, and Governance,” July 2026. https://www.egonzehnder.com/what-we-do/board-advisory/insight/ai-in-the-boardroom-rewiring-strategy-leadership-and-governance

•     Sarah Van Dyck, Christoph Wollersheim and Charles Gray, “AI on the Board Agenda: A Guide for Committee Chairs and Board Leaders for What to Own and Ask,” Egon Zehnder, 2026. https://www.egonzehnder.com/cdn/serve/article-pdf/1791473373-a9edae5240ebbd3fa7427fd5fdd88fe2.pdf

•     NVIDIA, “NVIDIA Announces CEO Transition,” press release, 12 November 2026. https://nvidianews.nvidia.com/news/nvidia-announces-ceo-transition

•     NVIDIA Corporation, Form 8-K, date of report 11 November 2026. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001045810/000104581026000082/nvda-20261111.htm

•     Steven Wolfe Pereira, LinkedIn post on Lindsay Trout’s board readiness article, 18 November 2026. https://www.linkedin.com/posts/wolfepereira_boardskills-boarddirectors-corporategovernance-ugcPost-7528893181065580544-skSZ/

•     LouAnn Conner and Ralf Barkemeyer, Journal of Management and Governance (Springer), 2026. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10997-026-09796-w

Related reading

•     LouAnn Conner, “Beyond the Matrix: The Next Evolution in Board Governance,” SagaciousThink, 21 June 2026. https://www.sagaciousthink.com/insights/2026/6/21/beyond-the-matrix-the-next-evolution-in-board-governance

•     LouAnn Conner, “The AI Risks Are Becoming Clear. Can Your Board See How They Reach the Company?,” SagaciousThink, 25 August 2026. https://www.sagaciousthink.com/insights/2026/8/25/the-ai-risks-are-becoming-clear-can-your-board-see-how-they-reach-the-company

•     LouAnn Conner, “A Skill on the Board Does Not Make a Board Capability,” LinkedIn, September 2026. https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/skill-board-does-make-capability-louann-conner-mug7c/